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Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators
Worry?
Hernan D. Bejarano, Lance Clifner, Carl Johnston, Stephen Rassenti, and Vernon
L. Smith

Abstract
Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource
adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many
difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity?
How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How
does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which
Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution
contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment
and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.
KEYWORDS: electric power networks, resource adequacy, capacity markets, demand response,
retail competition, central commitment
Author Notes: We would like to thank MISO (The Midwest Independent System Operator)
for providing most of the funding necessary to conduct an independent laboratory study with
scientific rigor. The kind and magnitude of support it provided for the examination of sometimes
controversial institutional alternatives is often hard to win for studies of this nature, and we are
very appreciative. We would like to thank Mr Bob Borlick for many keen observations on the
interpretation, implication, and presentation of the results that were generated by our experiments.
We would also like to thank Commissioner Bob Lieberman of the Illinois Commerce Commission
and Commissioner Sherman Elliot of the Illinois Commerce Commission for their assistance and
avid interest in the project.
The optimal power flow (OPF) model is solved using Matlab (from Mathworks.com) with the
MATPOWER third party extension. MATPOWER is a software package developed at Cornell
University, by Ray D. Zimmerman, Carlos E. Murillo-Sánchez & Deqiang (David) Gan.
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1. Introduction
The California electric power crisis ended a decade ago, yet the industry
continues to deal with the fall out. The causes of the crisis are reasonably well
understood. California began to restructure its power market in 1996, and put into
place a spot market for energy in 1998 but continued to regulate retail prices. A
heat-wave in the summer of 2000 caused power blackouts, a significant rise in
spot energy prices and complaints of market manipulation from state utilities.1
Blackouts continued into the winter of 2001. Gov. Gray Davis declared a state of
emergency on Jan. 17, 2001. By April, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. filed for
bankruptcy because it cost much more for the company to buy energy on the spot
market than it could earn back from customers who bought at a regulated price.
Factors driving up prices were high peak demand during the Summer of
2000 and a combination of other factors during 2001, including a lack of available
generation and transmission line capacity. In February 2002, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission began to investigate then defunct Enron Corp. for
various trading strategies that contributed to the problem by overloading power
lines and taking generator capacity out of production.
Since 2001, regional regulators and power groups proposed several
instruments to correct California’s wayward reforms, among them: 1) Demand
Response to create incentives to curb consumption when spot prices are high; 2)
capacity markets to subsidize cost of building new generation capacity; 3)
forward markets to give consumers access to long-term prices as an alternative to
regulated price caps and gather intelligence about future market conditions; 4)
revenue guarantees to give electricity investments added protection, and 5) open
retail competition which would allow markets to self-adjust.
These alternatives prompt many difficult questions. Does the development
of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a
government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does
centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system
in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees?
If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail
competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We
used laboratory experiments to address these questions. For a review of previous
laboratory electric power experiments, their incorporation into field trials, further
modification and eventual impact on final applications see Rassenti et al (2002).

1

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. filed a complaint alleging manipulation of the markets in August
2000.
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2. The Experimental Environment
We 2 developed a dynamic, interactive Internet–based platform that allows
participants to function as profit motivated decision makers in the roles of
distribution (buyers) and generation (sellers) companies in a real time competitive
market. The market environment has the following capabilities:
 Consumer demand cycling up and down during the various periods of each
day.
 Consumer demand growing in the long run.
 Generating assets with carrying costs, startup costs, and nonlinear marginal
fuel costs.
 Generation companies able to build new generators.
 A centrally coordinated Spot Market based on an Optimal Power Flow (OPF),
which provides system wide power at the lowest total cost and calculates
regional prices. An automated independent system operator (ISO) executes this
market.
 Distributors able to invest in Demand Response contracts with Consumers and
build small local peaking generators.
 Regulator Price Intervention in which the regulator evaluates average Spot
Market Costs and adjusts the allowable resale price of the local Distributors.
 A Forward Market in which all participants may engage in future period
contracts for differences.
 A Capacity Market in which suppliers may receive continuous payments for
capacity in return for a promise to deliver that capacity into the Spot Market.
 Self-versus Central-Commitment. Self-Commit is where the set of generators
dispatched (who’s turned on or off) is governed strictly by the marginal
generator offer prices submitted (using OPF), versus Central Commitment in
which the system operator uses a reliability based central commitment
algorithm to choose the set of dispatched generators, and guarantees all
dispatched generators their minimum revenue requirement.
 Retail Competition in which the Regulator allows the Distributors to charge
whatever retail prices they choose, but frees all regions to retail competition.
As implemented here, retailers in any region could compete in each other’s
territory. The software can easily accommodate the entry of new firms into and
or all the regional retail markets, but the experiments reported here do not
implement any expansion in the number of incumbent retail firms.
This human decision market interaction system allows us to configure a wide
variety of economic conditions and institutional rules (experimental
2

August Systems, Inc. and principals of the Economic Science Institute (ESI) at Chapman
University.
2
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treatments) by enabling or disabling the various capabilities in selected
combinations. Depending on how well they manage their assets, participants
acting as Distributors and Generators experience the viability and profitability
of their strategic choices in a dynamic, competitive environment. This system
was developed by August Systems Corporation in coordination with Vernon
Smith and Stephen Rassenti of the Economic Science Institute at Chapman
University.
All of the results from the scenarios presented in this report were run in
environments where the underlying economic conditions and initial generation
plant were identical. Each experiment lasted 12 experiment “years”, with 10
experiment “days” in each “year” and four experiment “periods” in each “day”.
Demand cycled from low to medium to high back to medium in the four periods
of each day to reflect the diurnal pattern of load, and there was an underlying
trend of demand growth3 during the 120 days of each experiment during which
time the Consumer demand would naturally grow by about 3.3% per year if retail
prices were not changing. Generating companies could independently set the
Spot Market offers of each generator asset they owned in each region of a three
region connected network, and could invest in building new generators at any
location of the system. Regulated Distribution companies operating in a single
region, could, when represented by active participants, actively invest in Demand
Response that could then be sold into the Spot Market. Distributors could also
construct some peak generation capacity as long as it did not exceed more than
10% of their peak load in any Region in which they operated4.
The network model we used was simple. It was meant to be an economics
and investment model and not a precision electricity-flow network model. As
such, the network had three nodes (cities) where there was both load and
generation. While the generators were discrete units, all of the generators at a
particular node were essentially treated as coming from the same point
source. Likewise, the load at each node was essentially treated as a point sink: all
load within a node was considered one point. The only transmission limitations
were imposed by the transmission lines connecting the nodes. The transmission
capacity of these lines was specifically chosen to be greater than the expected
transmission flow to simplify the system for the subjects. For subjects who were
more knowledgeable about electrical networks, it would be easy enough to make
the transmission lines a constraining feature of the system.

3

3.3% per year average compound growth rate, yields a total growth in demand of 48% from Day
1, Year 1 to Day 10, Year 12. See 'Demand and Investments in Capacity' below for more detail.
4
Distributors were not allowed to invest in Demand Response or build peaking generators in
Regions where they did not operate.
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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A diagram of the network is shown below in Figure 1: Three Node
Electrical Network The three nodes are the boxes labeled R1, R2, R3, with
connecting transmission lines, generating assets at each node denoted by Gn.m
and Distributors at each node denoted by Dn.m, where n indicates the firm ID,
and m indicates the asset ID.

Figure 1: Three Node Electrical Network
A system regulator controlled Distributor retail prices through Regulator
Price Intervention (RPI). Every three experiment days the regulator readjusted the
regional retail prices in the direction of wholesale spot market price changes. RPI
was not used in only two of the treatments: the baseline simulation 0.1, where
there were no active players (which was done for calibration), and in the ‘Retail’
experiments, where Distributors were allowed to set their own retail prices free of
regulation. The aggregate Consumer demand Drp in each region r for each of the
480 periods p (four periods each day for all 120 days) of the experiment was
preset in a demand file (see Figure 18: Schedule of Demand), and was exact given
that the regulator (or retailers) would maintain the retail prices at the original
reference retail price (PR = $70). However, when the allowable regional regulated
retail price was changed to PS by the regulator, automated Consumers responded
and the corresponding demand (Drp) (power consumed at the new price) changed
to Drp·(PR/PS)e to reflect the ratio between the newly set retail price and the preset
reference price. The constant elasticity of demand e was set to 0.2 (quite

4
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inelastic), so changes in demand for small changes in price were insignificant and
there was always demand for electricity even at very high prices.
The experimental environment was complicated (see example computer
interface screenshots for a Generator and a Distributor in Figure 19: Screen Shot
of Generator Computer Interface and Figure 20: Screen Shot of Distributor
computer Interface). Subjects who participated in these experiments were trained
twice for two hours each in the Dem environment (ID # 2 in Table 1) before they
were used to generate data in the experiments reported below. A significant
number of the subjects were cross-trained on both the role of the Generator and
Distributor, so that they were familiar with how both sides of the system worked.
In addition, the subjects were provided with continuous access to a training mode
version of the system over the Internet, so that they could use the system and be
able to play the roles of Distributor and Generators at the same time and learn
how the system works. A number of subjects were able to manipulate the system
to their advantage based on their experiences, including finding a few software
bugs in the system that they exploited to their advantage. The data from
experiments where subjects exploited software bugs was not used in the analysis
and the bugs were immediately rectified.
Computer coordinated auction market mechanisms in commodity flow
networks can work to allocate resources with very high efficiency when demand
and supply schedules are stable. A much more complex decision making
environment occurs when demand is growing and there are lumpy investment
possibilities. Though an efficient spot market can provide price signals for
appropriate investment, coordination issues can arise and a market mechanism
cannot provide appropriate incentives to undertake socially beneficial expansion
of a network. Specifically, rising spot prices in our electric power network might
signal of the need for future generating capacity, but this is a noisy signal, given
that in order to obtain profits investments in new plants must be coordinated. In
our experiment we provide subjects with a chance to announce a new generator
that will come online sometime in the future, begin planning and building, and
then withdraw from the commitment (up to a certain point) at a significant cost.
Note, that if a subject drops an announced future plant before it ever comes online
then he is signaling that he is willing to bear a cost to maintain his current market
position. This option should help to coordinate investment plans at a cost, yet we
still observe coordination failures in which subjects have trouble recovering their
investment costs given simultaneous competitive investment in new capacity.

Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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The following set of 10 experimental treatments was conducted with
subjects who were each at least twice previously experienced.
Table 1: List of Treatments
ID

Treatment

Participants

# Experiments

Treatment Code

0.1

Robot Generators

1 simulation

BotNoRPI

0.2

Spot, No Investment, No
RPI
Spot, No Investment

Robot Generators

1 simulation

BotRPI

1

Spot

Generators Only

5

Base

2

Spot,
Demand Response
Spot,
Demand Response
Forward
Spot,
Demand Response
Forward,
Capacity
Spot, Central Commitment

Generators
Distributors
Generators
Distributors

&

7

Dem

&

5

DemFor

Generators
Distributors

&

5

DemForCap

4

Cen

3
4

5

Generators Only

6

Spot,
Generators
& 4
DemCen
Demand Response
Distributors
Central Commitment
7
Spot,
Generators Only
5
Cap
Capacity
8
Spot,
Generators
& 4
Ret
Demand Response, Retail
Distributors
Legend for Treatment Capabilities (for more detail on the treatment configurations, see
Appendix I of the Supplementary Appendix5 on Treatment Descriptions).

Spot – Spot Market enabled in the treatment (all treatments include the spot
market).
No Investment – Generator sand Distributors are not allowed to invest in any
new generating capability.
No RPI – The retail price of power to consumers is held constant, there are no
retail price adjustments, allowing demand growth to follow the preset baseline
growth pattern exactly. All treatments with the exception of the two specifically
marked as No RPI and Retail use Regulatory Price Intervention to adjust the
retail price based on realized spot market prices.

5

http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-scienceinstitute/files/WorkingPapers/Johnston_Rassenti_Smith_Bejarano_etal_SupplementaryAppendix.
pdf
6
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Demand Response – Distributors are allowed to invest in Demand Response
Contracts and Distributed Peaking Generators.
Forward – Forward Markets enabled in this treatment, allowing Distributors and
Generators to enter into financial contracts on the future price of electricity.
Capacity – Capacity Markets enabled in this treatment, allowing Distributors and
Generators to enter into financial contracts to supply capacity to the system in the
future.
Central Commitment – Generators are allowed to specify minimum payments
for their generators to be committed and dispatched at any during the coming day.
Retail –Distributors are allowed to adjust the retail prices they offer their
consumers, and compete with other Distributors in all regions for those
consumers.
Note that in addition to the treatments in which human subjects participated
as Generators and Distributors, for comparative purposes, we are also reporting
the results of two baseline simulations in which there were no active participants
and robot bidders representing the generating companies always simply revealed
the true marginal costs for each generator into the Spot Market. In both baseline
treatments, the demand was generally upward growth with occasional points of
negative growth or higher-than-normal growth, and the generating assets in the
system remained fixed from the beginning to the end of the experiment horizon as
the robots never built any new capacity. In treatment BotNoRPI, the regulated
retail price remained constant (no RPI). In treatment BotRPI, the Regulator Price
Intervention (RPI) adjusted the regulated retail price every three days, which
caused changes in the actual Consumer demand.

3. Demand and Investments in Capacity
Resource adequacy can be defined as the ratio of net peak demand (aggregate
peak period consumer demand at the current regulated retail price net of all
demand response and distributor owned peak generation capacity), divided by the
total capacity of all generator firms. A ratio greater than 1.0 indicates a temporary
capacity shortage, with spot price spiking to the system maximum of 1000. These
capacity shortages occur with more or less frequency in the various experimental
treatments we conducted, and sometimes at different frequencies within the same
treatment if agents engage in different investment and pricing strategies. But
resource adequacy is not the whole story for consumers: it comes with a cost. In
our experiments the effectiveness of resource adequacy to make consumers better
off is strongly correlated with the ability of Distributors to invest strategically in
Demand Response and distributed peak generation. As an alternative to a
Capacity market, Central commitment with the promise of revenue guarantees for

Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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dispatch and reserve, can also attract investment in capacity, but then consumer
welfare becomes even more highly correlated with the possibility of strategic
Distributor activity.
In Figure 2 through Figure 11 below, total available capacity including DR,
generating firm capacity, actual demand, retail price, and spot market price are
plotted for the duration of a single typical run of each of the ten treatments.
The light blue line in each graph shows the total available generating
capacity in the system. Capacity for purposes of these graphs includes all
generation capacity (including distributor owned peaking units) and DR contracts.
The red line in each graph shows only the total generating capacity
under the control of the Generator firms.
The yellow line shows the actual realized total peak period demand served
in the system. The only exception is the BotNoRPI graph, where we explicitly
graphed the underlying demand profile to show the increase in demand over time,
including the embedded anomalies in demand where the demand was set to
deviate from the long-term trend (see periods 22, 40-50 as examples).
The dark blue line shows the peak period spot market price. The spot
market price graphed is the peak period weighted average spot market price over
all three nodes in the network.
The green line shows the retail price charged to consumers. The retail price
is the weighted average retail price over all three nodes in the network. In all but
the Ret treatment, the retail price is the same for all periods of the day, where the
retail price is calculated as a function of the weighted average of all previous spot
prices during the day. See Appendix VII of the Supplementary Appendix on
Regulator Prince Intervention (RPI) 6 for the precise algorithm for calculating
retail price.
The black line that only appears in the BotRPI case shows the underlying
demand base that was used in all treatments.
As long as the capacity line is above the demand line, capacity is sufficient
to satisfy peak demand. When the demand line touches (or goes above) the
capacity line, the system capacity is exceeded, resulting in the inability to meet
current demand, and a shortage that was executed as a partial blackout. Other
than the BotNoRPI graph, the amount of the shortage is not shown in these
graphs, as it is the served demand which is plotted.
Where the capacity line shows discontinuities and jumps upward represents
new generating capacity coming on-line. The larger the jump, the more capacity
that came on-line during that period. Generators may only be added to the
6

http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-scienceinstitute/files/WorkingPapers/Johnston_Rassenti_Smith_Bejarano_etal_SupplementaryAppendix.
pdf
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system, generators may not be physically withdrawn from the system, hence total
capacity generally only moves upward.
The Total Capacity line includes both generating units (Generator and
Distributor owned) and DR contracts. The Distributors may increase or decrease
their DR contracts at any time, so it is possible for the Total Capacity line to show
a decrease, which reflects a decrease in total DR contracts that could have been
caused by either the Distributors reducing their overall DR capacity and/or a
decrease in available DR due to an increase in Retail Price.
A generator may be effectively removed from dispatch by the Generator
owner setting offer prices for that generator at the system cap price. This is why
the spot price can sometimes hit the system cap price even though demand does
not actually exceed the available capacity.
In the treatments with Demand Response (DR), the available capacity is
much more fluid, shifting from day to day often with very small fluctuations.
This reflects the Distributors adding and withdrawing DR from the system
through the alteration of contracts and also fluctuations in available DR due to
regulator retail price adjustments and/or natural growth of demand.
Demand would naturally increase at an average of 3.3% per year if the
regulated retail price stayed constant at $70/MW. However, Demand decreases
when retail prices go up and increases when retail prices decrease according to the
demand elasticity equation. As can be seen in the underlying demand line in
Figure 2, there are also several preset deviations from the general growth trend in
the underlying demand (for example, at approximately period 20, and between
periods 40 and 50).
Retail price is adjusted every three days by RPI, which is seen by the steplike appearance of the retail price and demand lines on several of the graphs. The
BotNoRPI and Ret are the exceptions, since in BotNoRPI the retail price is never
adjusted and in the Ret graph the Distributors are free to change their retail prices
at any time during the experiment.

Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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Figure 2: Peak Demand versus Capacity, BotNoRPI
In BotNoRPI (robot generators, passive distributors and no regulator price
intervention), the retail price for consumers was held constant, allowing demand
to grow at the ‘natural’ rate reflected in the underlying demand data. Supply
remained constant throughout the duration of the experiment. At the point where
demand first exceeded the available supply, the Spot Market Price jumped to the
maximum system price and remained there for the duration of the experiment.
Since the consumers did not experience any price increase, they had no incentive
to modify their consumption habits—despite nearly continuous blackouts in the
high periods. This result, with distributors losing a fortune by buying at a high
spot price and selling at a low fixed regulated price, dramatically illustrate the
need for demand response contracts between distributors and their customers.

10
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Figure 3: Peak Demand versus Capacity, BotRPI
In BotRPI, Figure 3, (robot generators, passive distributors and regulator price
intervention), the retail price for consumers was adjusted every three days based
on the current Spot Market Prices. The retail price increase was generally enough
to decrease demand back below the available supply, and thus cause the Spot
Market prices to retreat. By the end of the experiment, the underlying demand
growth was great enough that the consumer retail price continued to escalate and
the high period Spot Market price remained pegged at the maximum system price,
$1000/MW. This result shows that even with the regulated retail price gradually
adjusting over time there can be a long period of debilitating losses for
distributors that can only be offset with demand response contracts.
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Figure 4: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Base
In Base, Figure 4, (active generators, passive distributors and regulator
price intervention), the experienced Generators were able to manipulate the Spot
Market price very early on, and also built new generating capacity. The Spot
Market prices caused the Retail Price to move upward and decrease demand. As
the new capacity came on-line, in conjunction with the slumping demand, the
Generators were unable to maintain the elevated Spot Market prices. Retail
Prices then decreased, allowing demand to grow significantly through the middle
portion of the experiment, until Spot Market prices once again began to rise,
which in turn caused demand to drop.
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Figure 5: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Dem
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In Dem, Figure 5, (active generators, active distributors and regulator price
intervention), the Distributors invested in adding Demand Response (DR) to the
system. At the point where the Generators were able to move the Spot Market
price upward, the Distributors activated and adjusted their DR and forced the Spot
Market price back down.
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Figure 6: Peak Demand versus Capacity, DemFor
In DemFor, Figure 6, (active generators, active distributors, regulator price
intervention and a forward market), we used the most experienced participants.
Gencos realized building early could be costly because Distributors could cheaply
purchase enough DR and build distributed generation to keep peak prices
suppressed for most of the experiment. 7 In the final 30 days we observed the
regulated price rising and a surge of investment in DR to control demand.
Forward contracts for differences attracted little participation as distributors

7

At the end, distributors would have to greatly increase the price they are willing to pay for DR
and can get caught unprepared when demand naturally increases past the critical point and puts the
system into capacity shortage mode encouraging Gencos to cooperatively raise bids.
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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would have had to pay too large a premium and preferred controlling their peak
period price risk through DR and building distributed generation.

4. Capacity Markets
Treatments designated “CAP” were designed to examine the effect of adding a
biannual Capacity Market to the simple spot market when active Demand
Response (DR) and distributed generation by Distributors is not a factor affecting
prices, tends to provide capacity that remains very close to Consumer demand in
the early going. Initially, generating firms often managed to hold a ‘no-build’
coalition together, but later they tended to provide capacity in excess of demand.
As demand increased, building began, spot prices decreased, and Generation
firms rushed to collect capacity payments. This treatment showed that a Capacity
Market by itself is not sufficient to keep installed capacity consistently above
peak demand especially under status-quo conditions where there is little pressure
from demand growth; whereas, the active participation of Distributors in the
marketplace seems to play a key role in providing resource adequacy whether and
when there is a Capacity Market.
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Figure 7: Peak Demand versus Capacity, DemForCap
In DemForCap, Figure 7, (active generators, active distributors, regulator
price intervention, a forward and a capacity market), the results from this
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representative experiment show an increase in investment in generation capacity
and a corresponding suppression of spot and retail prices.
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Figure 8: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Cen
In Cen, Figure 8, (active generators, passive distributors, regulator price
intervention, and central dispatch), the Generators requested high minimum
payments to be dispatched into the system, in addition to targeting high Spot
Market prices. This strategy caused the Retail Prices to elevate precipitously and
force demand down. Eventually, the Generators were not able to maintain their
high prices, and the Spot and Retail prices moved downward. But the Retail price
was still significantly higher than the other scenarios, and demand was also
significantly suppressed relative to other scenarios.
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Figure 9: Peak Demand versus Capacity, DemCen
Published by De Gruyter, 2012

Brought to you by | George Mason University
Authenticated | 129.174.21.5
Download Date | 1/5/13 3:26 PM

15

Review of Network Economics, Vol. 11 [2012], Iss. 4, Art. 3

In DemCen, Figure 9, (active generators, active distributors, regulator price
intervention, and central dispatch), the Distributors once again invested in
Demand Response and were able to use it to good effect to keep Retail Prices
down and allow demand to grow. Generators also built a several generators,
which resulted in an over-supply of capacity, which also helped to keep Spot
Market and Retail Prices lower.
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Figure 10: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Cap
In Cap, Figure 10, with this representative experiment, the Generators built
additional capacity of varying amounts throughout the experiment but peak spot
prices were high at the beginning, when Gencos did not build, and at the end
when demand increases gave them an easier environment for collusive pricing.
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Figure 11: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Ret
In Ret, Figure 11, (active generators, active distributors, and retail
competition), the Generators quickly forced the Spot Market price to the
maximum system price, and the Distributors reacted by immediately and
aggressively raising their Retail prices, which caused demand to plummet. The
Generators were unable to maintain their pricing levels, but the Distributors did
not lower their Retail prices proportionately. A second price spike by the
Generators was defeated by use of DR by the Distributors as well as by the
Distributors belated making slightly less aggressive upward movements in their
Retail prices over the remainder of the experiment.

5. Surplus of Consumers, Distributors and Generators
In the following figures, we compare the total surplus (net profits) gained by each
category of market participant (Consumer, Distributor and Generator) in each of
the eight treatments.
For Generators, surplus was calculated as their spot market revenues minus
their plant capital costs and generating costs. In those treatments where there was
a Capacity Market (Cap), Generator surplus was embellished by the capacity
payments they received minus any penalties paid for not delivering capacity to the
market. In those treatments where there was Central Commitment (Cen),
Generator revenues are sometimes embellished by ‘make good’ payments from
Distributors. These ‘make good’ payments were pledged as a way to keep
adequate generation capacity ready to serve.
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For Distributors, surplus was calculated as their retail market revenues
from selling to Consumers plus any additional revenues received from the spot
market by supplying demand response minus the cost of buying power in the spot
market. In those treatments where there was a Capacity Market, Distributor
surplus is diminished by its proportionate share (based on peak withdrawal) of the
total cost of supplying capacity to the entire system but embellished by any
capacity payments they receive for demand response minus any penalties paid for
not delivering capacity to the market. In those treatments where there was Central
Commitment (Cen), Distributor surplus was sometimes diminished by ‘make
good’ payments which were required to keep adequate generation capacity ready
to serve the market.
For both Generators and Distributors, whenever a forward (For) market
exists their final surpluses may be embellished or diminished depending upon
how their long run forward contract prices compare to the actual spot market
price.
For Consumers, surplus was the value of the electrical power received
minus the cost of purchasing it. Consumers and corporations use electrical power
for many purposes, for example, watching TV or manufacturing steel. Each use
created a different value for the customer depending on what the use was and
when and where the use occurred. When all of the values for all of the customers
in each of the experiments were added up, that represented the consumers' value
for electricity. When all of the amounts that consumers spent to buy electricity
were added up, that was the consumers' cost. In this research, the area underneath
the consumers’ demand curve up to the current retail price was integrated, and the
retail cost of electricity times the power consumed was subtracted from that value,
and yielded the consumer surplus (or Consumer “profit”).
In Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14, box plots show the aggregate surplus
of Consumers, Distributors, and Generators, respectively, realized over all periods
of all experiments in each treatment. The black bar inside of each solid box
represents the median surplus observed in each treatment. The left and right edges
of each solid box respectively represent the 25th percentile (below which we
observed 25% of the outcomes) and the 75th percentile (above which we observed
25% of the outcomes). The ‘whiskers’ extend to the effective boundary of the
observed distribution, beyond which we observed only 1% of the outcomes in
either direction. Results presented in each figure are ordered from highest to
lowest median values.
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Figure 12: Consumer Surplus by Treatment
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar
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Figure 13: Distributor Surplus by Treatment
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar.
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Figure 14: Generator Surplus by Treatment
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar.

6. Prices in the Retail and Spot Markets
Figure 15 below contains a box plot of the retail prices charged by the regional
Distributors to Consumers over all periods of all experiments in each particular
treatment. In all cases (except for Ret) the regional prices were controlled by the
regulator who under regulator price adjustment (RPI) allowed the Distributor a
markup of 15% on all his costs: spot market energy costs, make good payments
(under Cen), and capacity payments (under Cap). In the retail competition
treatment (Ret), Distributors could charge any prices they wished but faced the
potential competition from other retailers.
Figure 16 contains a box plot of the spot market prices charged by the
Generators to Distributors over all periods of all experiments in each particular
treatment. Spot market location-adjusted regional prices were calculated by
ordering the offers of all Generators, and all Distributors willing to invoke
demand response (Dem) when that was an option, and conducting an optimal
power flow algorithm to satisfy demand at minimum cost.
In the case of the two treatments which involved Central Commitment (Cen
and DemCen), Figures 8-9 interprets the spot price to include the average ‘make
good’ payment per MW of capacity provided, as that is the effective spot price
paid by the Distributor. Thus, if 1,000 MW were delivered at the spot price of
$50/MW and total ‘make good’ payments of $20,000 were required for that
period, then the effective spot price was considered to be $70/MW (= $50/MW +
20
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$20,000/1,000MW). Note that these ‘make good’ payments are why the Spot
Market price reported in the Cen treatment in Figure 16 exceeds the system price
cap.

Figure 15: Retail Prices by Treatment
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar.

Figure 16: Spot Prices by Treatment
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar.
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7. Summary and Conclusions
In the California electricity 'crisis' in 2001, wholesale price volatility was extreme
and, together with fixed (controlled) retail prices, created havoc -- rolling
blackouts and (for the leading private utility) bankruptcy. The public
unappreciatively recalls the great inconvenience of uncertain and inadequate
power supply. The experiments we report implement various sorts of institutional
innovations that have been suggested to avoid power shortages and reduce
marketplace volatility. But at what cost? We examine the potential efficacy of
some of those policies in results summarized below:

8. Active Distributors
Figure 12 indicates that the presence of active Distributors and Demand Response
(Dem) significantly enhanced the surpluses of Consumers. Conversely, the
absence of Demand Response created sizeable extra surplus for Generators and
Distributors (Figure 13 and Figure 14) at the Consumers’ expense. Remarkably,
Consumers’ benefits were uniformly greater in ALL treatments that featured
active Distributors (Dem, DemFor, DemForCap, and DemCen), compared to
the set of treatments where Distributors were passive price takers (Base, Cap, and
Cen). The surplus results of the retail competition treatment (Ret) will be treated
separately as the absence of price regulation creates a unique environment.

9. Capacity Markets
Figure 12 indicates that Capacity Markets (Cap) by themselves did not improve
long-run Consumer welfare versus the Base with no active Demand Response.
Capacity Markets lowered Consumer surplus slightly and raised retail prices
(Figure 15) which includes the capacity charges the Distributors passed on to pay
for the capacity guarantee. Capacity Markets alone did encourage the construction
of more capacity than regulated Generators tended to build when left to their own
devices (Appendix, Statistical Results, Table 7).
However, without the discipline from the demand side, Capacity Markets
alone did not reduce spot market prices on average. And Capacity Markets, by
themselves, did not encourage the building of as much capacity as any other
alternative tested, especially when compared to the daily revenue guarantees of
Central Commitment with ‘make good’ payments and active Distributors. In the
alternative treatment which included a Capacity Market (Cap) along with active
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Distributors (Dem) and a forward market (For), Consumers fared very well and
plenty of capacity was built to accommodate growth.
The Capacity Market entails a periodic charge that is assessed across all
Distributors in all periods. This charge lifts the spot price up every period, which
contributes an upward offset to the average spot price versus treatments without a
Capacity Market and treatments with features other than just a Capacity Market.
It is clear that in systems with Capacity Markets operating, Spot Market prices are
not diminished by the presence of those Capacity Markets, as there is always peak
capacity held outside the purview of capacity commitment that controls the
critical peak prices, and compensation from the one sided hedge against spot
prices above the Designated Limit Price (DLP) costs more than it's worth to the
consumers.

10. Central Commitment
Central Commitment, by itself, depresses Consumer surplus while benefiting
Distributors and Generators. Effective spot market prices increased as they
included a biddable uplift received for just being ready for dispatch if spot
revenue was not adequate to cover fixed and capital costs. Consumers ultimately
pay for the ‘make good’ guarantees demanded by Generators, as Distributors pass
on those charges through regulator price intervention (RPI). However, the
revenue guarantees of Central Commitment make it an attractive investment
environment stimulating more investment in capacity than in other treatments,
including Capacity Markets. In the alternative treatment which included active
Distributors (Dem) along with Central Commitment, Consumers fared much
better and plenty of capacity was built to accommodate growth.

11. Retail Competition
Under retail competition (Ret), the exclusive service contracts of regional
regulated Distributors were replaced with open retail competition and unregulated
pricing to Consumers. These conditions produced a substantial increase in
‘demand-adjusted’ retail prices, especially during peak periods (Figure 15).
Demand fell sharply (Figure 11) as did Consumer surplus (Figure 12). In other
words resource adequacy never became an issue because retailers simply raised
prices whenever power became scarce in the wholesale market.
As demand fell so did the need for investment in new generating capacity
and this is reflected in measures of demand and investment in capacity as reported
in Appendix Table 5 and Table 6. At the same time, measures of Distributor and
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Generator surplus rose substantially. All of these can be seen as rational shortterm responses to incentives as electricity suppliers smooth out demand with
higher prices at peak periods, thereby reducing the need for investment in
Generators’ capacity. More study would be required to understand whether the
reduction in Consumer surplus remains a long-term effect.
Recall that Ret was implemented to allow incumbent retailers to invade
each other’s territory, but entry by new retail firms was not an option. An open
question is whether this limitation is important in evaluating the effectiveness of
retail competition.

12. Concluding Observations: What Have We Learned?
Concerns for resource adequacy in electric power networks have led regulators to
propose various institutional alternatives to secure the adequate provision of
electric power. There is a complex set of questions the regulator must address in
assessing these alternatives.
How important is the development of Demand Response (DR) on the part of
a Load Serving Entity (LSE, aka Distributor) in reducing the level and volatility
of wholesale electricity prices, reducing the need for additional generator
capacity, and maintaining a high level of Consumer benefits?
How effective is a government-mandated Capacity Market in fostering
efficient investment in new capacity and maintaining a high level of Consumer
benefits?
How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees for
deployed generators) affect Consumer benefits as compared to a system in which
Generators must voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantee?
If the exclusive service contracts of regulated Distributors were replaced by
open retail competition with unregulated pricing to Consumers, what would be the
short and long run effects on investment, market prices, and Consumer benefits?
We developed an interactive software platform in which trained cash
motivated human decision makers functioned as of Generating Companies and
Distributors (LSEs) in a set of dynamic, multi-year power network market
experiments to address these complex questions. The participants’ earned
considerable cash profits during the experiments which depended upon their
strategic bidding in Spot, Forward, and Capacity Markets, and their investment
decisions regarding building new generation capacity and negotiating contracts
with consumers for demand withdrawal.
The experiment’s statistical analyses substantiate a number of findings.
First, the presence of active Distributors, with the ability to coordinate Distributed
Generation (DG) and offer demand response (DR) through flexible contracts with
Consumers, benefited Consumers by controlling wholesale spot prices and
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regulated retail prices. Additionally, Demand Response (DR) contracting reduced
the need for investment in new generation capacity through reduction of peak
demand. Capacity Markets by themselves (with no DR) provided no benefit for
Consumers who were required to pay for the surplus capacity, but created sizeable
extra surplus for Generators and Distributors at Consumers’ expense.
Second, when Capacity Markets were combined with DR and DG, peak
demand and capacity were more closely matched than in the scenarios where
either market structure was in place in isolation. Consumers’ Surplus also
increased in the joint scenario over that achieved in either the Demand Response
or the Capacity Market scenarios in isolation. Central Commitment, by itself,
depressed Consumer surplus while benefiting Distributors and Generators.
However, Central Commitment did stimulate more investment in capacity when
compared to some other treatments8, including having a Capacity Market. This is
due to the mandated ‘make good’ payments which provide revenue guarantees to
the Generating firms as a way to keep adequate generation capacity ready to serve
each period.
Third, when DR and DG, were added to the Central Commitment scenario it
reduced retail prices, benefiting consumers; however, it also produced wholesale
price spikes that coincided with demand growth later in the trading horizon.
Retailers made Retail Markets work by raising retail prices to smooth out peaks in
demand and reducing wholesale spot prices. This lessened the need for additional
capacity but reduced overall Consumer surplus. Market alternatives, including
Capacity Markets (vs. none), and Central Commitment (vs. Self-Commit),
improved Consumers’ surplus only when combined with ‘active’ Distributors.
The ultimate importance of ‘active’ Distributors’ ability to enter flexible
contracting arrangements, which allows them to be responsive at critical times
and to build critical peak distributed generation capacity, can be succinctly
illustrated by the two data time series in Figure 17. This graph plots peak period
electricity prices for the duration of two different “12-year” experimental
horizons. The dotted line at the top of the graph shows a typical series of retail
prices where there is a Capacity Market but no ‘active’ Distributors (no DR or
DG): retail prices were very high and Consumers do not fare very well. The solid
line on the bottom shows a typical series of retail prices in a case where there
were ‘active’ Distributors (DR +DG) and a forward market: retail prices were
significantly lower and Consumers fared much better.

8

A ‘treatment’ is a precise set of parameters used to configure the software to model a specific
scenario. The complete list of treatments, or scenarios, is shown in Table 1.
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Figure 17: Average Retail Prices in Selected Treatments.
Compared are two treatments: 1) Active Distributors with the ability to
invest in Distributed Generation, Demand Response and Forward Markets (solid
line), versus 2) Passive ‘price-taking’ Distributors with active Generators who
may participate in a Capacity Market (dotted line).
The price ‘wave’ in the Capacity Market experiment graphed shows a
typical example of retail prices decreasing after a lump of new capacity comes
online. However, retail prices increase again as demand continues to grow,
without further investment in additional capacity. In contrast, the ‘active’
Distributors in the Forward Market above were able to keep the peak prices lower
and very level. Indeed, the data show that whatever the configuration of market
disciplining mechanisms are in place, those that are combined with ‘active’
distributors did the best job of keeping prices low and steady.
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13. Appendix
This appendix includes the experiment’s list of acronyms and a summary of its
statistical results.

14. Acronyms and Terminology
Table 1 : List of Acronyms and Terminology
Term
BTM
DG
DLP
DR
LSE
Make
Good
OPF
Retail
Price
RPI

Spot Price
Surplus

Treatment

Description
Behind the Meter. Generation capability owned and operated by the consumer.
Distributed Generation. Small nodal peaking generators.
Designated Limit Price. When a Capacity Contract is entered, the specified
volume of supply must be offered into the system at or below the DLP.
Demand Response. DG and Contractual agreements between Distributors and
Consumers whereby Distributors pay Consumers to temporarily reduce their
demand (frequently with BTM generation).
Load Serving Entity (aka Seller or Distributor)
Payments from Distributors to Generators, after a period which make up the
difference between guaranteed revenues promised to the Generators by the ISO as
a way to keep adequate generation capacity ready to serve and the actual revenues
achieved in the Spot Market.
Optimal Power Flow. The algorithm used to determine generator dispatch and
spot market prices in the networked system model.
The price for electricity charged by Distributors to Consumers.
Regulator Price Intervention. The Regulator (in this case, the server’s software)
reviews the current retail price vs. the spot market prices over the last n days, and
then modifies the retail price such that a certain profit can be achieved by the
Distributors. See Appendix VII of the Supplementary Appendix on Regulatory
Price Intervention (RPI) for more details.
The price for electricity charged by Generators to Distributors.
The profit realized by a group. There are three surplus numbers used in this report.
A simplified representation of the surplus calculations performed in this research
is:
Generator Surplus = (SpotPrice – Cost/MW)*MWsGenerated
Distributor Surplus = (RetailPrice – SpotPrice)*MWsConsumed
Consumer Surplus = (Value – RetailPrice)*MWsConsumed
A specific configuration of parameters used in setting up a research scenario.
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15. Statistical Results
Following is a set of tables which summarize the statistical results of the data
accumulated from the experiment.
Table 2: Consumer Surplus Averages by Treatment

Table 3: Distributor Surplus Averages by Treatment
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Table 4: Generator Surplus Averages by Treatment

Table 5:
Actual Demand by Treatment

Table 6:
Retail Prices, means and median
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Table 7: Capacity Measures (Means) at End of Each Experiment by
Treatment

Table 8: Retail Prices by Treatment
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Table 9: Spot Price Averages by Treatment

16.
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